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Abstract 
Market views on EMU enlargement are measured by a new indicator based on the short- 
-term dynamics of forward spreads. Conceptually, this indicator stems from the notion of 
ambiguity-averse agents in the sense of Knight. Specifically, we attempt to operationalize 
the incomplete preferences framework, which may allow for multiple equilibria supported 
by one set of fundamentals. This equilibrium indeterminacy may offer a way to reconci- 
le short-term fluctuations of market prices with a relatively stable underlying economic 
environment and expectations. The method was applied to data from Central European 
countries, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Comparing our 
results with financial market opinion surveys, the results of the proposed method seems to 
be in accordance with market expectations. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we propose a new approach to the measurement of how markets 
perceive the prospects of future euro area enlargement. For a monetary authority this 
is a relevant analysis, because financial market participants are forward looking. There-
fore, their reactions to changes in official short-term rates depend on their beliefs 
about the future time path of interest rates. Future interest rates depend on entry into 
the monetary union. Thus, to have a good forecast of how the markets will react to 
current monetary policy, one needs to measure what they think about the EMU pro-
spects of the national economy.  
Even before the EMU was launched in 1999 considerable interest was focused 
on methods of extracting market views of the project, and various methods were de-
signed to infer the probability of a particular country becoming a member of the EMU.  
In the EMU calculators, which are typically
1 based on the term structure of inte-
rest rates, the EMU entry of a given country is treated as a random event and observed 
or  implied  interest  rate  forwards  are  used  to  estimate  its  probability.  In  particular, 
forward spreads are viewed as a weighted average of zero, stemming from the union 
scenario being realized, and some non-zero value of the non-EMU scenario. 
In our approach we attempt to recover additional information by analyzing 
* We benefited from valuable comments by Ignazio Angeloni, Jarko Fidrmuc, Phillipp Hartmann, Peter
Hoerdahl, Kirstin Hubrich, OndĜej Kameník, Sujoy Mukerji, Caroline  Nehrlich, Adrian van Rixtel, Ales-
sandro Sbuelz and Ralph Sueppel. We thank Magdalena StĜedová for excellent data support. All errors and 
omissions are ours. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent those of the Czech National Bank or the European Commission. This work was supported by
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the short-term dynamics of forward spreads. To justify this we appeal to the robust 
equilibrium indeterminacy arising in the ambiguity aversion model of Rigotti and 
Shannon (2005). We argue that this approach might be particularly useful when for-
ward spreads are narrow. 
In general, there are two ways to assess market perceptions. They can be in-
ferred from prices of market instruments or, alternatively, survey evidence can be 
relied upon. It is of significance to cross-check these two information sources, be-
cause the beliefs expressed in the surveys are not necessarily incentive compatible 
and may differ from the beliefs or assumptions that investors act on. Therefore, we 
compare the results of our market-data-based method with the results of the Reuters 
opinion survey. 
The relationship between forwards, the probability of EMU membership at 
time Ĳ, and the conditional expected interest rate differential is usually written as  
**
,, , , , ,, (1 ) ( | )
EMU
tT t t T T tT ff E r r n onEMU WW W W W S          (1.1) 
where  ,T r W  and 
*
,T r W  denote respectively national and foreign (euro area) interest rates
2 
as of time Ĳ and with maturity T. Further,  ,, tT f W  and 
*
,, tT f
W  are domestic and foreign inte-
rest rate forwards as of time t, with horizon Ĳ and maturity T. Indeed, all the probability 
distributions involved in relationship (1.1) are risk-neutral ones. The literature mostly 
ignores this fact, although Bates (1999) argues that this neglect is harm-less. 
There are several complications regarding equation (1.1). First, forward rates 
for long horizons on the left-hand side might not be traded and then implied forwards 
need to be estimated. Nevertheless, estimating them from yield or swap curves is 
quite straightforward and reliable under the no-arbitrage assumption. In the applied 
part we rely on implied forwards estimated from interest rate swaps via the boot-
strapping method. 
Second, a much more difficult problem is how to determine the expected 
future interest rate spread conditional on non-EMU membership at time Ĳ. This is 
the major aspect in which the term-structure-based calculators differ. 
Third, as Bates (1999) notes, the EMU calculators are most robust when na-
tional and foreign (euro area) interest rates would differ substantially in the case of 
the country not joining. In other words, formula (1.1) can form a basis for estimating 
,
EMU
t W S  only if the expected future spread 
*
,, (| ) tt t Er r nonEMU WW   is large enough in 
absolute terms. Otherwise, forecast errors and other potential biases would make 
the EMU and non-EMU cases hard to distinguish and  ,
EMU
t W S  would not be identi-
1 Bates (1999) surveys various methods and categorizes them between those based on currency option
contracts  (e.g.,  (Butler,  Cooper,  1997),  (Aguilar,  Hördahl,  1998))  and  methods  utilizing  the European 
forward interest rates (e.g., (Morgan, 1997), (Favero et al., 1997), (Angeloni, Violi, 1997), and (Lund, 
1999)). A lack of data hinders use of the option-based approaches. At the time of the analysis the earliest 
new EMU entrants could have been expected in several years’ time but the maturity of the interbank cur-
rency option contracts for the analyzed countries did not extend much over one year. It is also too early to
apply the time series exchange rate models. Indeed, Aguilar and Hördahl (1998) show that GARCH vo-
latility estimates fell to very low levels only around two years before the EMU was launched. 
2 Before the EMU was launched the asterisk usually denoted Germany, but in the current context it denotes 
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fiable. Therefore, the early research focused mainly on Italy and several other coun- 
tries with a history of substantial interest rate differentials that could be extrapolated 
into the future as non-EMU interest rate paths.
3 However, low inflation has prevailed 
in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and many of these potential euro 
area entrants have independent central banks pursuing inflation t argets cl ose t o 
the ECB target. One can assume that the low inflation environment would be sus-
tained and that interest rate spreads would remain low regardless of whether these 
countries join the euro area. The Czech Republic is a good example of a country for 
which the EMU and non-EMU scenarios for interest rates could be too close for 
making reliable assessments about the EMU probabilities using forward rate levels 
only. 
Finally, in our view there is the crucial issue of how to interpret daily fluc-
tuations in forward spreads. Both explanatory factors of the current forward spread 
on  the right-hand  side  of  equation  (1.1)  characterize  medium  to l ong-term  ex-
pectations,  and  the fundamental  information  that  could  affect  them  arrives  at 
a relatively low frequency. In other words, it does not seem reasonable that either 
,
EMU
t W S  or 
*
,, (| ) tT T E rr nonEMU WW  can vary in such a way as to explain the short-term 
fluctuations of
*
,, ,, tT tT f f W W  . However, the short-term dynamics might contain useful 
information, especially when the conditional non-EMU interest rate spread is low 
and the probability of entry is high. 
These issues are addressed in section 2, where we develop a framework in-
volving  Bewley  preferences  and  equilibrium  indeterminacy.  In  section  3  the esti-
mation  of  a linearized  version  of  this  model  is  estimated  for  forward  spreads  of 
several CEE countries. In section 4, these empirical results are pitted against market 
surveys and official euro strategies are discussed, because these are natural reference 
points for methods aimed at measuring market views. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Utilizing the Short-term Dynamics of Forward Spreads 
Relationship (1.1) is an abstraction which neglects short-term influences that 
may cause day-to-day fluctuations in the observed forward spreads. We can write 
a formal decomposition of the actual market spread (ACT) between the fundamental 
part (FEQ) and the short-term noise.  
                                
**
,, ,, , ,, ,, () ()
ACT FEQ
tT tT t tT tT ff ff W WW WW H                                 (2.1) 
However, we need to clarify which factors might be behind the noise. In fact, 
it is difficult to explain short-term fluctuations with relatively stable fundamentals 
(i.e., probability  ,
EMU
t W S  and the factors behind the expected future interest rate spread) 
and to keep the simple paradigm of frictionless markets dominated by rational agents 
who maximize their expected utility. The modern financial markets always clear and 
an equilibrium situation prevails. Therefore, one needs a model that allows multiple 
equilibria supported by one set of fundamentals. One possible option is the general 
equilibrium model with uncertainty-averse agents developed by Rigotti and Shannon 
(2005). This model features financial markets that are characterized by robust in-
3 For instance, at the beginning  of 1996,  three  years  before  the EMU  was  launched,  the long  horizon 
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determinacy  in  equilibrium  prices  and  allocations  for  any  specification  for  initial 
endowments. 
2.1 Equilibrium Indeterminacy 
The distinction between risk and uncertainty (ambiguity) is a promising way 
of  addressing  various  financial  market  puzzles.  In  the Knightian  sense  (Knight, 
1921), agents face risk when they know the probability distribution of an event. But 
the event is uncertain when the distribution itself is unknown. Since the expected uti-
lity is not readily defined in this framework, there has to be an alternative way of 
modeling the preferences of agents. 
Theories of ambiguity aversion have become increasingly studied recently. 
Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2004) provide an overview of ways of modeling exotic 
preferences, and a very incomplete list of the more recent research on the subject and 
its application includes (Mukerji, Tallon, 2004a,b), (Barillas, Hansen, Sargent, 2007) 
and (Hansen, Sargent, 2007). In our application, we appeal to Rigotti and Shannon 
(2005), who, inspired by Bewley (2002), consider a general equilibrium model in 
which agents’ beliefs may be characterized by multiple priors and in which an agent 
prefers one consumption bundle to another one if it has a larger expected utility for 
all priors that the agent considers to be reasonable. 
There are various other approaches to studying the ambiguity aversion of agents. 
The uncertainty can be modeled by means of the Choquet expected utility (Schmeid-
ler, 1989) or using maximum expected utility (Gilboa, Schmeidler, 1989). However, 
as Rigotti and Shannon (2005) note, these models were found to yield indeterminate 
equilibrium outcomes only in limited circumstances. This contrasts with the generic 
indeterminacy stemming from Bewley preferences. 
The incomplete preferences over lotteries could be rationalized in the context 
of the term structure of interest rate spreads. For example, agents may estimate the fu-
ture interest rate differential using some econometric model, perhaps in a way simi-
lar to JPMorgan (1997) or Favero et al. (2000), but they cannot be certain that their 
model is correct. However, even if they believe in the model, they cannot estimate its 
parameters exactly, because they have only a limited number of observations. They 
can estimate  the mean and variance of  the future  interest  rate  spread  only with 
an error. In effect, they obtain not a single distribution of future interest rates, but 
rather a set of distributions, perhaps characterized by confidence intervals of means 
and  variances.  Or viewed from  a Bayesian  perspective,  they  arrive  at a joint dis-
tribution of parameters and variables. 
Agents who maximize their expected utility would use the estimated distribu-
tion of these parameters and calculate the posterior forecast, but uncertainty-averse 
agents make a different choice. They are indifferent with regard to the outcomes associ-
ated with any of the admissible distributions. In other words, an agent who is maximiz-
ing his expected utility cares even about a marginal difference between the market and 
his theoretical price, while uncertainty-averse agents do not mind unless the difference 
is significant. 
2.2 Ambiguity Aversion in the Context of EMU Calculators 
In this section we show that ambiguity aversion may explain the existence of 
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First, some further notation needs to be introduced. All the contracts we are dealing 
with are of the same maturity. Therefore, for simplicity, the subscript T indicating 
their maturity can be dropped. Furthermore, let 
* x rr W WW   denote the future spread 
as of date Ĳ. And let  yW  be a Bernoulli variable for which  1 yW    if the country is 
an EMU member at time Ĳ and  0 yW    if it is not. 
Since the money markets merge under EMU membership, rational agents must 
believe that  0 xW    in such case. However, in the non-EMU cases,  xW  could be a ran-
dom variable described at time t by some probability distribution function. 
Agents face uncertainty and so their beliefs about  xW  may be characterized by 
more than one distribution. Denote by  , t W * a collection of distributions that agents con-
sider reasonable. Formally, the distributions of the future interest rate spread condi-
tional on EMU membership at time Ĳ as perceived by market participants at time t 
can be written as  
                   (0 |1 ) 1 t px y WW                            (2.2) 
         , (| 0 ) tt px y W WW *           ( 2 . 3) 
Agents are also uncertain about the marginal distribution of yW . This uncertainty 
about the Bernoulli distribution is described by some subset  , t W 3  of the unit interval so 
that , (1 ) tt py W W 3   . The joint distribution of the EMU-membership indicator  yW  and 
the spread  xW can  be  factorized  as  , (,) (| )() tt t t pp x yp x y p y W WW W W W {  and  therefore 
the set of reasonable joint distributions  , t H W is  
,, ,
,
{: ( | ) ( ) ,
           where  ( | ) satisfies (2.2) and (2.3) and  ( 1) }
tt t t t
tt t
Hp p p x y p y
px y py
WW W W W W
W WW W 3
  
 
   ( 2 . 4) 
If the distribution of future spreads and EMU membership is exogenous for 
market participants, it is possible to use the indeterminacy result of Rigotti and 
Shannon (2005). They show that any equilibrium with some set of beliefs is also 
an equilibrium with a larger set of beliefs. Furthermore, if there is a unique equi-
librium only with risk (i.e., with no uncertainty) then all equilibria under uncertainty 
converge to that risk equilibrium as the uncertainty shrinks. 
Let us further assume that there exists an equilibrium only with risk for every 
distribution in  , t H W  and denote by  , t H W  the set of their risk-neutral counterparts. Any 
,, tt pH W W     can be factorized as 
                          , (,) (| )() tt t t pp x yp x y p y W WW W W W {                       (2.5) 
The definitions of  , t W *  and  , t W 3   follow: 
             ,  ={ ( ) = ( | = 0) for any  } tt , t t t tt t t , t t , t g :g x p x y p H W *            (2.6) 
               ,, ,  ={:=( = 1) for any  }
EMU EMU
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Finally, for a particular  , t p W  rewrite relationship (1.1) as  
,,
,, , , , *
,, , , () ( (| ) ) ( 0 ) ()( 1 ) ()
tT
tt t t t pp p g g EMU
tT t t f fE x E E x yp yE x E x
W
WW W W W
W WW W W W W W W S           
      (2.8) 
We  can  see  that  there  may  exist  an interval  of  forward  rate  differentials 
consistent with agents’ beliefs. For example, assume that  ,, ,    =,
LH
tt t W WW 3S S  and also 
that 
,






WW W W * J   

  and 
,






WW W W * J   







 is  also  an interval.  Then  it  follows  from  (2.8)  that  the equi-
librium forward rate differential falls in the interval between  ,, , (1 )
L HL
tt t B W WW S J    and 
,, , (1 )
H LH
tt t B W WW S J   .  
The size of this band depends on the level of the EMU-membership proba-
bility and on the magnitude of the uncertainties involved. For example, assume that 
the estimated  expected  future  spread  is  200  basis  points  (b.p.) a nd  that  the 95% 
confidence  interval  of  this  estimate  is  150  b.p.  wide.  Therefore,  we  might  put 
, 125
L
t W J   b.p. and  , 275
H
t W J   b.p. Unless agents are completely sure that the country 
will be a member state at a given date Ĳ, there could be an interval of equilibrium 
forward spreads. For example, if the uncertainty is  ,  = 0.9,1 t W 3   then any forward 
spread in the interval between 0 and 35 basis points can represent equilibrium. How-
ever, consider the same uncertainty about EMU membership but for a lower pro-
bability level; for example let ,  = 0.4,0.5 t W 3  , then the band of equilibrium spreads 
would be much wider, between 62.5 and 165 basis points.  
2.3 Band of Inaction with Fully Optimizing Speculators  
Here we argue that the band of inaction may arise even when the most rele-
vant agents maximize expected utility. Assume that there are two types of market 
participants, namely, hedgers and speculators. 
Hedgers enter the market to unload their idiosyncratic interest rate position. 
These might be, for example, banks with a mismatch between their assets and lia-
bilities or corporations that trade swaps to exploit their comparative advantage in 
some market segments. We assume that they do not have any predictive ability re-
garding  the future  interest  rate  path.  In  terms  of  the Rigotti  and  Shannon  (2005) 
model, one may view them as being uncertainty averse, and considering any distri-
bution of future spreads reasonable. 
On the other hand, we assume that speculators are expected utility maximi-
zers. At the same time, they gather information and have a good forecasting capa-
bility  and,  therefore,  they  are  those who actually  determine  the market  price  and 
make it informative. We assume that they have no natural position in the future in-
terest rate spread and thus they do not have any hedging needs.  
Consider  the speculator’s  problem.  If  his  theoretical  future  value  is  higher 
than the market forward value, then he might consider opening a long forward posi-
tion. However, he would enter the deal only if its expected return is high enough to 
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with returns of other contracts, then its expected return per unit of standard error 
should be positive. On the other hand, we assume that there is an upper bound for 
the Sharpe ratio of any available contract. Any deal with a higher Sharpe ratio would 
be just too good and would be quickly arbitraged away. Let   
max
t O denote the Sharpe 
ratio of the market portfolio and write this condition as 






Er e t u r n
return
O d       (2.9) 
In the context of standard asset pricing models   
max
t O could be identified with 
the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio.  
Let  , ˆ   t p W and  , ˆt g W  denote the forecast distributions that characterize the beliefs 
of the speculator as of time t. Denote also  , ˆˆ (1 ) tt , py WW W S    and 
, ˆ 2




W W 6   . 
Then his expectations of the future interest rate spread and its variance are: 
,, , , ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ () ( (| ) )( 1 ) ()
tt t t pp p g ExEEx y Ex
WW W W
W WW W W S      
,, , , , ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ var ( ) (var(|) ) v a r(( | ) )
tt t t t pp p p p x Ex y E x y
WW W W W
WW W W W   =           (2.10) 
= 
, ˆ 22




WW W W W S6 S S    
The expected profit from a long position in the forward spread is therefore  
             
, , ˆ ˆ **
,, ,, ˆ (( ) ) ( 1)( ) ( )
t t g p
tt tt Ex f f Ex f f
W W
W WW W W WW S                      (2.11) 
and the variance of this profit is  
           
, , ˆˆ *2 2
,, ,,, ˆˆ var ( ( )) (1 )( ( ) )
t t pg
tt ttt xff E x
W W
WW W W W W W S6S                      (2.12) 
It follows from (2.9) that 
  
, , ˆ ˆ *2 2
,, , , , , ˆˆ ˆ (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ){ ( ) }
t t g g max
tt t t t t t Ex f f Ex
W W
WW W W W W W W SO S 6 S   d         (2.13) 
Inequality  (2.13)  shows  us  that  there  is  an interval  of  admissible  forward 
spreads consistent with a single set of fundamentals reflected in speculators’ beliefs 




W ,  , t W 6 . The right-hand side of inequality (2.13) shows the maximum de-
viation of the forward spread from the theoretical value which is not arbitraged away. 
It also defines a band of inaction; any forward spread within the band may represent 
some market equilibrium. Thus, within the band the forward spread may fluctuate er-
ratically, responding to the immediate supply and demand conditions. But forward- 
-looking agents would prevent the price from moving beyond the band’s boundary. 
2.4 Model Predictions  
When markets are not completely sure that the country will be a member of 
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The less precise is the market estimate of the non-EMU conditional spread 
(i.e., the greater is
2





W , the wider is the band. For wider bands it could be more dif-
ficult to detect any error correction. Therefore, it could be more difficult to find any 
error correction for countries with a history of volatile and high interest rate spreads. 
These may be countries that are less integrated into European trade or countries with 
a history of high inflation.  
There is some ambiguity as regards the dependence on the horizon Ĳ. There 
may be two factors pulling in opposite directions. The perceived probability of entry 
, ˆt W S  is – at least in the baseline scenario – non-decreasing as a function of horizon. 
This would lead to a narrowing band. On the contrary, the forecasting error 
2
, t W 6  in-
creases with the horizon, making the inactivity band wider. The actual balance of 
the two effects depends on the features of the individual countries. The first effect 
could be weak for countries that are likely to join soon because for them  , ˆt W S  is quite 
high already for short horizons. The second effect is likely to be stronger for coun-
tries that are for some reason more difficult to analyze. Moreover, for given beliefs 
regarding the non-EMU spread, the band width also depends on the perceived pro-
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  that maximi-
zes the size of the region where prices are not informative. 
Moreover, for given beliefs regarding the non-EMU spread, the band width 
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   that maximizes the size of the region where prices are 
not informative. 
This dependence is important for the reliability of EMU calculators, which 
may be relatively high when  , ˆ 1 t W S o  but declines quickly when EMU membership 
becomes less likely. 
2.5 Noise Distribution 
The goal of this section is to provide a link between relationship (2.1) and 
the models of sections 2.1 and 2.3. The reality is more complicated than simple two- 
-period models. Agents are heterogeneous, and there will be trading between times t 
and Ĳ. Therefore, one can hardly expect any sharp breaks at the edges of the indif-
ference interval. It might be more natural to view them as fuzzy reflecting barriers 
which push the market back with an intensity negatively dependent on the distance 
between the market price and the barrier. 
The reflecting barriers can be modeled so that the forward spread walks ran-
domly when it appears far enough from any of the barriers, but is pushed strongly 218                                Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 5-6 
back if it approaches a barrier or even moves beyond it. Therefore, when the band 
is wide enough one might note almost no error correction, but for a narrow band 
the error correction could be very strong. 
The nonlinear error-correction behavior of  , t f W and
*
, t f W , which depends on 
the spread’s distance from the barriers  1,
L
t B W   and 1,
H
t B W  , may take the form 
               
**
,1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,1 ,1 ,, ǻ (( ) ) ( )
LH
tt t t ttt t fk B ff k ffB WW W W WWW W H                          (2.14) 
               
** * * * *
,1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,1 ,1 ,, ǻ (( ) ) ( )
LH




a kx a e

  for  0 x t and  () kx x a    for  0 x  . Here parameter b controls 
how thick the barrier is, while a determines how strongly it pushes back. Moreover, 
parameter a must depend on the width of the band. While it needs to accommodate 
narrow bands, it must also allow for almost independent drift within a wide band. 







  , where parameter  0 A !  repre-
sents the maximum push for the very wide bands as  limtanh( ) 1 x    forx of. Fi-
nally, function 
* k  is defined similarly, except that a, b, A are replaced by 
* a , 
* b  and 
* A . 
In this specification, when far enough from any of the barriers the variable can walk 
almost randomly with a very small drift towards the middle point of the band. 
In the empirical part we use a linear approximation of equations (2.14) and 
(2.15). However, the nonlinear specification is useful for interpretation of the esti-
mated linear error correction coefficients. They represent the average reaction, which 
is low for bands that are wide relative to the size of shocks and high for narrow 
bands. As discussed above, the width of the bands is related to the uncertainty and 
also to the level of perceived EMU probability.  
The linear approximation of (2.14) and (2.15) can be written as  
               
**
,1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , , ǻ () ()
LH
tL t t t H ttt t ff f B f f B WW W W W W W W DD H                     (2.16) 
                
** * * * *
,1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,1 ,1 ,, ǻ () ()
LH
tL t t t H ttt t ff f B f f B WW W W W W W W DDH                    (2.17) 
Assuming for simplicity that  2 LH DD D    and 
** * 2 LH DD D   , we may rewrite 
the error correction as  
                                        
*
,1 , 1 , , , ǻ () tt t t t ff f WW W W W DE H                                     (2.18) 
                                        
** * *
,1 , 1 , , , ǻ () tt t t t ff f WW W W W DE H                                   (2.19) 




tt ff WW   . If it moves only 
slowly with t or if it is constant, then (2.18) and (2.19) can represent an error cor-
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3. Estimation and Empirical Results 
If the time series of  , t f W and 
*
, t f W are not stationary, then (2.1) defines a coin-
tegrating relationship between them. If the non-stationarity of the estimated forward 
spread can be rejected and the series do not diverge, then we may estimate the error- 
-correction model 
         
**
,1 1 , 1, , , ǻ () ( ) ǻ () ǻ tC t t C t t t ff f L f L f WW W W W DD E \ ) K                      (3.20) 
       
** * * * * * *
,1 1 , 1, , , ǻ () ( ) ǻ () ǻ tC t t C t t t ff f L f L f WW W W W DD E \ ) K                    (3.21) 
Using this model we analyzed the dynamics of forward differentials against 
euro rates for several European countries. The countries were selected to have dis-
tinct prospects of becoming EMU members and also to have different economic cha-
racteristics. In particular, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland were 
analyzed. This selection was dictated mainly by data availability. We also consider-
ed it useful to do the same analysis for some other countries with a zero or negligible 
chance of adopting the euro any time soon. Indeed, benchmark results for these coun-
tries might help to assess the overall usefulness of the method. Therefore, we also 
analyzed Denmark (narrow ERM II band, opt-out clause), Sweden (wide ERM II band, 
no opt-out clause), and the UK (outside the ERM II opt-out clause). 
Because we replace  , t W E  in (2.18) and (2.19) by a constant  C E , there is a trade- 
-off as regards the sample length. The time series should be as long as possible to 
capture  the dynamic  properties,  but  on  the other  hand  the market  assessment  of 
the country’s prospects of joining the union may evolve over time, so in this respect 
a shorter sample would be more desirable. As a compromise we choose to estimate 
the above specification for the four-month period running up to May 2006, when our 
sample finishes. 
For the sample period we estimated the average error correction coefficients 
for each country and horizon and tested the residuals for stationarity. To do so we 
employed the augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) test for residual-based cointegration 
with a constant and time trend. We used the critical values devised by MacKinnon 
(1993).  
Section 2.4 suggests that several regularities should be observed. First, from 
the discussion of equation (2.13) it follows that the higher is the perceived proba-
bility of EMU entry, the tighter should be the no-arbitrage band. For a given dis-
turbance  size,  a higher  perceived  probability  should  lead  to  higher  linear  error 
correction coefficients. Therefore, prospective EMU entrants might exhibit higher co-
efficients as the forward horizon increases. This indeed holds, with the caveat that 
the perceived distribution of non-EMU future spreads does not depend on the horizon 
too much, which can be the case of the Czech Republic with its stable monetary po-
licy and already low inflation target. 
On the other hand, Slovakia has articulated its willingness to join the EMU as 
soon as possible. Thus the error-correction coefficients do not necessarily need to be 
an increasing function of the maturity horizon; they are high already for short horizons. 
Therefore, they may even decline for long horizons as a result of increasing , t W 6 . 
Conversely, for countries with no EMU prospects one should observe no ho-
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as the UK or Switzerland, one might even expect no cointegration. On the other hand, 
for countries with low 
EMU
W S  but closely linked to the EMU, for example by a fixed 
exchange rate regime (e.g. Denmark), cointegration should be detected due to pre-
sumably low , t W 6 . 
Also, higher uncertainty regarding the conditional non-EMU spread, and also 
a higher expected value thereof, should lead to a wider band and consequently to 
lower coefficient estimates. Therefore, countries with a history of relatively high and 
volatile spreads could have weaker error correction. Thus, we might expect Poland 
and Hungary to exhibit lower coefficients than, for example, the Czech Republic. 
Furthermore, since a small country’s rate is more likely to be attracted to the euro 
rate than vice versa, it seems reasonable to expect that most of the adjustment would 
happen through changes in  , t f W  rather than 
*
, t f W . Therefore, we might expect  0 C D d  
and
* 0 C D | . 
3.1 Data and Estimation of Implied Forwards 
Forward contracts are traded for some maturities and horizons, but the implied 
forwards most often have to be estimated. Estimation is possible using government 
bond yields or interest rate swap rates. This issue is mostly technical and, compar- 
ed to the other potential difficulties, is relatively easy to tackle. But it may gain in 
importance when the absolute difference between forward rates is low relative to 
the potential errors introduced by the estimation methods. 
While Favero et al. (2000) estimate instantaneous forward rates from govern-
ment bond yields using the specification of Svensson (1994), Lund (1999) derives 
instantaneous  forwards  from  the zero-coupon  curve  estimated  using  the bootstrap 
method with  linear  interpolation from  interest  rate  swaps.  Others,  like  JPMorgan 
(1997) or Angeloni and Violi (1997), directly used forward rates with finite maturity 
(five- and one-year maturity respectively), also derived from interest rate swap rates. 
As described in Favero et al. (2000), since the forward rate with horizon Ĳ and ma-
turity T, i.e., in , t f W , is the average of instantaneous forward rates over the period be-
tween W  and  T W   the estimated probability in this case is rather the average of the in-
stantaneous probabilities over the period weighted by the interest rate differentials. 
For estimating forward rates, we prefer to use benchmark interest rate swaps 
rather than government bond yields, because they are standardized and have a fa-
vorable structure, which allows for derivation of precise zero coupon curves. This is 
important  because  we  have  to  deal  with  relatively  narrow  forward  spreads  and 
therefore we tried to avoid any interpolation and ad hoc specification. Therefore, we 
did not follow Favero et al. (2000) or Lund (1999) in estimating instantaneous for-
wards  from  the Nelson-Siegel-Swenson  specification,  but  rather  adapted  the ap-
proach of Angeloni and Violi (1997). 
We estimated one-year forwards directly from benchmark interest rate swaps, 
quoted in annual maturities. The daily data are available from Bloomberg. First, to 
extract the term structure of interest rates (the zero coupon curve) we used the boot-
strap procedure as for example in (Anderson et al., 1996), which relies only on 
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traded, this procedure allows derivation of the term structure  of interest rates, in-
cluding  the implied  synthetic  one-year  forward  rates  for  different  horizons,  with 
virtually no approximation.  
In general, the data on the benchmark IRS curves are of very good quality, but 
some large outliers may occur. We checked the data very carefully and cleaned these 
obvious data errors.  
To save space we present graphically in Figure 1 only a snapshot of the IRS 
yield  curves  for  several  countries  in  comparison  with  the euro  benchmark  curve 
(plotted as a dashed line). Figures showing the dynamics of forward rates in relation 
to euro rates as well as the source data are all available on request. 
3.2 Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland  
The estimates for the Czech Republic listed in Table 1 reflect the predictions 
of the model well. Moreover, they are also consistent with surveys of finance pro-
fessionals in the Reuters poll reported in Table 8. This is encouraging, as the method 
is intended to gauge market views. 
The implied forward spreads for the Czech Republic can be considered stationa-
ry for all horizons over two years. Moreover, all speed of adjustment parameters CZK D  
are significantly negative and intuitively sized. They increase with the forward horizon 
FIGURE 1  Swap Curves as of 25 Apr 2006 
(solid line – the local currency IRS, dashed line – the euro IRS;  
maturity in years) 
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and become almost unity for 8-year horizon forwards. This fits well with the Reuters 
poll. At the time the survey was conducted, all the respondents thought that the Czech 
Republic would be an EMU member by 2015 at the latest. It is also reassuring that 
the euro adjustment parameter 
*
CZK D  is insignificant.  
The negative value of the equilibrium spread  CZK E  should not be surprising 
given the main characteristics of the Czech economy. These include an inflation tar-
get of the Czech National Bank that is quite close to that of the euro area, and real 
appreciation, which apparently stems from the converging economy. These two fac-
tors imply trend appreciation of the Czech koruna and, through the interest parity 
condition, low domestic interest rates. 
The results suggest that for short horizons the markets focus on domestic 
macroeconomic  indicators  and  the inflation  forecast  of  the Czech  National  Bank, 
while the long end is likely to be driven by EMU pricing. The current trading prac-
tice seems to be in line with such an understanding, as has been confirmed in infor-
mal discussions with fixed income dealers.  
This interpretation, if true, would have important consequences for the mone-
tary policy of the Czech National Bank. It would mean that even now it can steer 
only a part of the forward curve, and the closer the unification date gets, the less 
power its monetary policy will have.  
The results for Slovakia, reported in Table 2, indicate that forward rates can be 
considered cointegrated with European ones from horizons over five years, which 
refers to the year 2011. The estimated coefficients are negative and, from that hori-
zon onwards, also quite high in absolute terms. This corresponds well with the Reu-
ters poll, in which all respondents expected Slovakia to join the EMU in 2011 or be-
fore. Also similarly to the Czech case, the euro adjustment parameters are very small 
and insignificant. 
However, the results are not as clear cut as in the Czech case. One might 
argue that if the interest-rate swap market signals a likely date for EMU enlarge-
ment, say 
* W , then after 
* W ,  C D should remain as negative as at 
* W  and the fundamen- 
TABLE 1  Estimated Error Correction Coefficients for the Czech Republic  
Horizon 
 




































































CZK  0.913  0.304  0.966  0.573  0.058  0.381  0.376  0.791  0.549 
LM test 
EU  0.583  0.881  0.277  0.525  0.795  0.368  0.244  0.196  0.956 
Note: Appropriate critical values of the AEG Ĳ-test for 1 %, 5 % and 10 % are in all cases -3.9, -3.34 and 3.04 
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tal spread  C E should remain as close to zero as at 
* W . However, this seems not to be 
the case with Slovakia. 
Therefore, one may be tempted to test, for example, whether the estimated para-
meter SKK D for the horizon 9*10 is significantly lower in absolute terms than the ones 
for the shorter horizons. However, one would perhaps be expecting too much from 
the method. Recall that the linear model (3.20) to (3.21) was inspired by the non- 
-linear error-correction relationships (2.15) and (2.16). Therefore, one should not be 
surprised by some irregularities. Indeed, the linear method was chosen for simplicity 
and as a first approximation. Ideally, one should estimate the properly chosen non- 
-linear specification directly. 
Cross-country comparisons might be problematic, but weaker error correction 
could be noticed for Slovakia when compared to the Czech case for horizons beyond 
the maximum entry (EMU Poll) date. One may speculate that the higher historical 
level and higher volatility of Slovak interest rates lie behind this result. 
TABLE 2  Estimated Error Correction Coefficients for Slovakia 
Horizon 
 




































































SKK  0.535  0.409  0.265  0.985  0.987  0.196  0.249  0.162  0.052 
LM test 
EU  0.198  0.372  0.827  0.371  0.664  0.624  0.628  0.613  0.561 
Note: See Table 1. 
TABLE 3  Estimated Error Correction Coefficients for Hungary 
Horizon 
 




































































HUF  0.632  0.290  0.609  0.356  0.872  0.388  0.517  0.430  0.821 
LM test 
EU  0.673  0.277  0.717  0.066  0.314  0.364  0.413  0.703  0.227 
Note: See Table 1. 224                                Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 5-6 
The estimation results for Hungary in Table 3 reveal a much weaker tendency 
of Hungarian rates to revert towards European rates than in the Czech and Slovak 
cases. There was an indication of cointegration from the six-year horizon onwards, 
but the error correction coefficients are low in absolute terms. However, the Reuters 
poll maximum is 2016, which is even beyond the scope of our empirical analysis. 
Polish rates, reported in Table 4 also exhibit a quite weak tendency to revert 
to euro rates for longer horizons. The maximum of the EMU Poll for Poland is 2015, 
i.e., on the nine-year forward. Poland’s historically high and volatile interest rates are 
consistent with this result. And note here also that the European parameters 
*
HUF D  and 
*
PLZ D  are again virtually zero. 
3.3 Other Countries  
To obtain a better feel about the new methodology it might be useful to pon-
der the results for other countries that have distinctly different characteristics, name-
ly, Denmark, Sweden, and the UK. Denmark participates in the tight ERM II regi-
me, but has negotiated an opt-out clause. Sweden represents an EU country without 
an opt-out clause but outside of the ERM II, and the UK is both outside the ERM II 
and opting out. 
After a referendum that rejected EMU membership in 2000, Denmark parti-
cipates in the ERM II with a very narrow fluctuation band for its currency. No new 
referendum is planned and there is no chance of Denmark participating in the EMU 
in the foreseeable future. The effectively pegged exchange rate with free trade and 
capital flows means that the Danish central bank has to mimic the monetary policy of 
the ECB. Under such circumstances one might naturally expect Danish forwards not 
to diverge far from European ones. And indeed, there is cointegration between these 
pairs for all horizons, as Table 5 shows. However, the speed of adjustment  DKK D  does 
not reveal any dependence on horizon, which is intuitive. 
Swedish forward rates are cointegrated with European ones and tend to be 
affected by the differential over the euro for almost any horizon. On the other hand, 
the European coefficient 
*
SEK D  again came out small and in most cases insignificant 
(see Table 6). 
TABLE 4  Estimated Error Correction Coefficients for Poland 
Horizon 
 




































































PLZ  0.080  0.206  0.675  0.749  0.968  0.410  0.775  0.845  0.472 
LM test 
EU  0.107  0.744  0.617  0.106  0.171  0.499  0.397  0.372  0.417 
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The United Kingdom’s future membership in the euro area remains highly un-
certain. The pound floats freely and is a currency of global importance. Under such 
circumstances, one should expect no easily detectable short-term relationship be-
tween the dynamics of British and European forward rates. As demonstrated in 
Table 7, the forward rates tend not to be cointegrated, and for cases where statio-
narity of the residuals cannot be rejected the error correction coefficients  GBP D  are in-
significant. 
4. Official Strategies and Survey Interpretations of EMU Enlargement 
Since the late 1990s, Reuters newswire services have been conducting market 
surveys concerning EU and EMU enlargement. During the 1990s, such market polls 
were conducted monthly for the old EU Member States, with the results being released 
and often compared to several published EMU calculators, such as the JPMorgan EMU 
calculators (published in the Financial Times). Currently, these polls are conducted 
TABLE 5  Estimated Error Correction Coefficients for Denmark 
Horizon 
 




































































DKK  0.652  0.073  0.194  0.041  0.146  0.525  0.472  0.137  0.207 
LM test 
EU  0.758  0.083  0.183  0.124  0.106  0.457  0.501  0.419  0.514 
Note: See Table 1. 
 
TABLE 6  Estimated Error Correction Coefficients for Sweden 
Horizon 
 




































































SEK  0.440  0.392  0.367  0.543  0.989  0.981  0.493  0.970  0.350 
LM test 
EU  0.914  0.660  0.108  0.157  0.558  0.315  0.695  0.933  0.282 
Note: See Table 1. 
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biannually on the non-euro area EU Member States that joined the EU in May 2004 
(Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Slo-
vakia) and in January 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) as well as for several candidate 
countries (Croatia and Turkey). Reuters surveys around 30 strategists and political 
analysts across Europe for their views on dates of joining the monetary union and 
the exchange rate mechanism as one of the preconditions prior to EMU entry. The res-
pondents also provide their expectations about exchange rate parities of national cur-
rencies vis-à-vis the euro 
The polls provide a genuinely helpful insight into market perceptions about 
the timing of euro adoption and about other related issues. However, the results have 
to be interpreted with some caution, because there are big outliers among them and 
also because some of the answers are not internally consistent. In particular, some 
responses to questions about ERM II entry and euro adoption do not reflect the Maas-
tricht requirement that a country should remain in the exchange rate mechanism for 
at least two years before it is allowed to adopt the euro. Table 8 presents a summary 
of the latest results on the question of the expected timing of EMU accession for 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.  
One might expect the Reuters polls to coincide approximately with the official 
strategies adopted by these countries.
4 In mid-2006, the national euro adoption plans 
in all the sample countries, except for Slovakia, were postponed, mainly due to loose 
fiscal policy and a worsening fiscal stance. Indeed, the Slovak ministry of finance re-
ported that Slovakia’s preparations for entering the euro area were proceeding ac-
cording to the government’s plan to adopt the single currency in 2009.  
As regards Poland, in May 2006 its former government set 1 January 2012 as 
the target date for euro introduction. Later on, both the National Bank of Poland and 
the new government declared an intention to join the euro area as soon as possible, 
but only after the budget is close to balance. This is expected to delay ERM II entry 
until 2011 and euro entry until 2013 or 2014. However, opinion polls indicate that 
most Poles would like the euro to be the Polish currency. 
TABLE 7  Estimated Error Correction Coefficients for the United Kingdom 
Horizon 
 




































































GBP  0.318  0.565  0.298  0.210  0.808  0.948  0.808  0.134  0.141 
LM test 
EU  0.363  0.760  0.712  0.467  0.404  0.348  0.654  0.866  0.578 
Note: See Table 1. 
4 The national euro-strategies referred to in this section date back to mid-2006, to be in line and compar-
able with the results of the Reuters polls of the same date as well as with our estimations. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 5-6                                        227 
 
At the time of the survey, Hungary was planning to adopt the euro as its offi-
cial currency on 1 January 2010, but that date has since been abandoned because of 
an excessively high budget deficit. Currently, there is no clear target date, but a euro 
adoption plan is scheduled to be prepared in mid-2008.  
Turning to the Czech Republic, its original plan was to enter the ERM II in 
2008 or 2009, which was later postponed to 2010. However, the current government 
has officially dropped any target date, saying the Czech Republic will clearly not meet 
the economic criteria, mainly due to the large general government deficit. Currently, 
2013 is considered the earliest changeover date, although the recently communicated 
new euro-adoption strategy has not specified any date for euro adoption, preferring to 
wait for future fiscal developments and the future impact of fiscal reforms.  
For a general overview of our model estimates, surveys, and official dates 
see Table 9. It shows that the latest date revealed by the poll seems to be the most 
relevant indicator for comparison with the empirical method. On the other hand, 
the modes of the survey responses correspond very well with the countries’ official 
strategies.  
5. Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research  
This paper deals with the measurement of market beliefs about the entry of se-
veral of the non-euro area EU countries into the euro area. A novel market-based in-
dicator complements the traditional so-called EMU calculators, which use the current 
level of forward interest rate spreads. By contrast, the new indicator attempts to re-
cover additional information by analysing the short-term spreads' dynamics. There-
fore, it is less dependent on the difficult estimation of the hypothetical non-EMU 
paths for interest rates, which are essential for other EMU calculators. Thus, this 
method might also be particulary suitable for countries for which the non-EMU sce-
nario interest rates are very close to the EMU rates and for which forward spreads are 
very narrow. All this makes level-based methods difficult to apply. 
TABLE 8  Expected EMU Entry Dates According to Reuters Poll  
(38 professional respondents, May 2006)  
In what year do you expect the following countries to enter the EMU, i.e., formally 
adopt the euro? 
  Median Mean  Mode  Latest  Earliest 
Czech Rep.  2010  2010  2010  2015  2009 
Hungary  2010  2011  2010  2016  2010 
Poland  2012  2012  2012  2015  2010 
Slovakia  2009  2009  2009  2011  2008 
 
TABLE 9  Expected Euro Adoption Dates, as of May 2006 






Czech Rep.  2014  2015  2010  date dropped 
Hungary  after 2015  2016  2010  2010 
Poland  after 2015  2015  2012  2012 
Slovakia  2011  2011  2009  2009 
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In our model, short-term fluctuations of the forward spreads do not neces-
sarily reflect changes in fundamentals and beliefs. However, these fundamentals and 
beliefs constrain the process of day-to-day changes in forward spreads and in certain 
cases lead to error correction behavior. 
The notion of short-term fluctuations decoupled from changes in fundamen-
tals is hard to reconcile with standard models in which rational, forward-looking, 
risk-averse agents seek to maximise their expected utility and in which the financial 
markets are frictionless.  
The background to the method applied here is the theory of uncertainty pro-
posed by Bewley (2002) and recently refined by Rigotti and Shannon (2005). Spe-
cifically, the most important feature of the theory is that it allows a continuum of 
equilibrium prices and allocations, i.e. there may be more equilibria consistent with 
one set of fundamentals. This equilibrium indeterminacy may allow to study influen-
ce of fundamentals separately from short-term noise in the forward spreads. It justi-
fies the existence of the constrained inaction band and, in general, it leads to non- 
-linear error correction behavior of prices. 
Estimates of market expectations about the timing of the euro adoption are 
a useful point of reference for monetary policy making, because these beliefs influ-
ence how markets react to current interest rate changes. However, to achieve a com-
plete picture, one should complement the measurement of market expectations with 
economic analysis of the integration and convergence process with respect to the EU 
and EMU and with the information provided by surveys. 
The empirical investigation that illustrates the theory makes use of a simpli-
fied linear version of the error-correction model. It was applied on financial market 
data in Central European countries, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovakia. The results were compared with the Reuters EMU Poll survey as well 
as with the plans presented by national authorities. It turns out that the latest date 
revealed by the poll seems to be the most relevant indicator for the comparison. It is 
reassuring that our method and the survey results give a consistent message. 
However one should note that, the theory of Bewley (2002) and Rigotti and 
Shannon (2005) is only a static model. For better treatment of the subject, one would 
need a fully specified dynamic forward-looking model. Also, the empirical model is 
a linear approximation of the non-linear error correction supported by theoretical con-
siderations, and therefore a change in specification in this direction may lead to further 
improvement of the results. However, these issues are beyond the scope of the cur-
rent paper and are left for future research. 
Furthermore, the paper presents a partial equilibrium analysis and treats beliefs 
about future interest rates as exogenous. Ideally, beliefs about equilibrating price va-
riables should be derived from the model parameters via equilibrium analysis. Never-
theless, this also exceeds the narrow subject of EMU calculators and is also left for 
possible future research.  
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